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The genesis of 
import substitution 
in Latin America 
Richard Lynn Ground* 
The process of import substitution that got 
underway in Latin America in the train of the Great 
Depression was principally a spontaneous response 
to the radical deterioration of the international 
prices of primary products, to the breakdown of the 
multilateral international trading system (and the 
collapse of world trade) and to the abrupt reversal of 
resource transfers. 
The major Latin American economies 
recovered sooner and more vigorously from the 
Great Depression than did most developed countries 
or most other underdeveloped areas. The contrast 
with the outcomes observed in the wake of the 
adjustment to the international debt crisis in the 
1980s could scarcely be more marked. 
In the first and second parts of this study the 
magnitude of the external shocks is briefly 
documented, the domestic policy response is 
examined, and an overview of the growth 
performance of the Latin American economies 
during the Great Depression and World War II is 
presented. In the third part the Prebisch thesis and 
the origin of price distortions in Latin America are 
analysed. 
*The author was formerly a staff member of the 
ECLAC Economic Development Division, but now works in 
the World Bank, Grateful acknowledgement is made for the 
helpful comments and encouragement provided by Andrés 
Bianchi and Aníbal Pinto. The views expressed in this 
article are those of the author and are not necessarily shared 
by ECLAC or the World Bank. The author likewise assumes 
full responsibility for any errors or shortcomings in this 
study. 
This article is a slightly modified version of a chapter 
from the essay entitled "The economic development of 
Latin America: Towards a contribution to a new synthesis 
of development theory" which was written by Richard L. 
Ground and Andrés Bianchi. This essay was presented at a 
seminar entitled "A Comparative Study of Economic 
Development in Asia and Latin America" which was held 
in Tokyo from 22 to 24 February 1988 under the 
sponsorship of the Institute of Developing Economies, 
I 
The Great Depression 
and the genesis of 
import substitution 
Although the terms of trade of most Latin 
American countries decreased steadily over the 
course of the 1920s in the wake of the gradual 
deflation of world price levels and the build-up 
of massive stocks of primary products following 
the spectacular rise in international prices (espe-
cially of commodities) in the last years of World 
War I, in general that decade was one of high 
growth in Latin America as world demand 
remained buoyant and capital flowed into the 
region on an unprecedented scale. Thus, in spite 
of the fact that the average international price of 
the most traded primary products plunged about 
40% between the early and the late 1920s,1coun-
tries like Argentina and Colombia registered 
overall growth rates of almost 6% and more 
than 7%, respectively, over the course of that 
decade, while in the 1925-1929 period Chile 
achieved a growth rate of almost 11%, Colombia 
and Brazil recorded rates of over 7 %, and Argen-
tina and Honduras experienced one close to 6% 
(table l).2 
1. The extent and transmission of the 
industrial-country depression 
Between 1929 and 1933 the index of the gross 
domestic product of the industrialized countries 
as a whole dropped 17%.3 In the United States, 
which had become Latin America's most impor-
tant trading partner in the wake of the First 
World War, the depression was especially 
severe. In effect, between 1929 and 1933 output 
•See D. Felix, "Alternative outcomes of the Latin American 
debt crisis: lessons from the past", Latin American Research 
Review, vol. 22, No. 2 ( 1987), table 3- Note that between 1923 and 
1929 the world stocks of the major international commodities 
more than doubled. 
2See also ECLAC, Series históricas del crecimiento de América 
Latina, "Cuadernos Estadísticos de la CEPAL" series, No. 3, 
Santiago, Chile, 1978. 
'B. Eichengreen and R. Portes, "The anatomy of financial 
crisis", Seminar Paper No. 375, Institute for International 
Economic Studies (University of Stockholm) (January 1987). 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
I N SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1920-1950" 
(Annual average growth raies) 

































































nosedived, falling by more than 29%. Of the 
region's other major trading partners, the con-
traction of economic activity reached 30% in 
Canada, 16% in Germany and 11% in France, 
measured between their respective pre-
depression peaks and depression era troughs. It 
was only in Great Britain, which remained the 
principal trading partner for countries like 
Argentina and Uruguay, that the downturn was 
more in the nature of a recession, as output there 
fell but 5% between 1929 and 1931.4 
As a result of this involution of economic 
activity, unemployment simultaneously soared 
to unprecedented heights. Indeed, in the United 
States the rate of unemployment skyrocketed 
from 3% of the labour force in 1929 to more 
than 22 % in 1932, while over the same period in 
Canada it climbed from less than 2% in 1928 to 
over 19%, in Germany it more than quadrupled 
from 3.8% to 17.2%, and in Great Britain it rose 
from around 7% to over 15%.5 
Price deflation broadly paralleled the shrin-
kage of economic activity in North America, but 
considerably outstripped the contraction of out-
put in the other major industrialized countries. 
Thus, in the United States the price level, after 
having declined 15% over the course of the 
1920s, dropped 25% between 1929 and 1933, 
and in Canada it fell almost 30% in the first 
years of the depression. On the other hand, the 
average decline in prices in France, i.e., 30%, was 
almost three times the decrease in gross domes-
4A. Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), table A6. 
5A. Maddison, op.cit., table C6. 
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tic product; in Germany it was more than double 
the fall in the product, and in Great Britain it was 
likewise double the reduction in economic activ-
ity, though it was thus considerably less pro-
nounced than in the other developed countries.6 
As a result, the decline in money demand in 
the industrialized countries, and hence the nomi-
nal value of world trade, far outstripped the 
contraction of economic activity in these coun-
tries and reduction in the quantum of world 
imports. In effect, the index of the quantum of 
imports of the industrialized countries, taken 
together, dropped 23.5% between 1929 and 
1932, but the nominal value of the imports of the 
latter plunged 49%.7 
Moreover, the extent of the decline in the 
international prices of primary products was 
considerably greater than the average decrease 
in international prices and hence markedly 
greater than the deflation of the international 
prices of manufactured goods and of services. 
Thus, the terms of trade of the developed coun-
tries as a whole actually improved almost 15% 
between the peak level of activity recorded in 
1929 and the depths of the Great Depression in 
1935.8 
Also underlying the observed disintegration 
of world merchandise trade was the violent 
reversal of resource transfers. Thus, while the 
United States and Great Britain invested more 
than US$11.3 billion abroad between the mid-
and late 1920s on a net basis, between 1930 and 
1934 the industrialized countries repatriated 
US$8.4 billion of capital from the rest of the 
world, and in the 1935-1938 period they brought 
home another US$4.8 billion.9 The total transfer 
of resources from debtor to creditor nations over 
the course of this period was considerably larger, 
especially during the first part of the 1930s, 
when a good number of debtor nations 
continued to effect at least partial payment of 
interest on their foreign debts. Remittances of 
profits continued, albeit on a much reduced scale, 
throughout the period. Consequently, domestic 
income, and especially domestic absorption, fell 
Hbid., table C3. 
'Calculated from data in B. Eichengreen and R. Portes, 
op.cit., 1987, table 3. 
Hbid. 
Hbid., pp. 16 and 19. 
significantly less in the developed countries than 
did output. 
The fact that the contraction of the quantum 
and particularly of the value of the imports of the 
industrialized countries far surpassed the extent 
of the decline in their economic activity was due, 
of course, to the erection of gigantic trade barri-
ers and massive subsidization of commodity pro-
duction.10 If these countries had instead resorted 
mainly to exchange rate policies to adjust rela-
tive prices, the extent and duration of the fall in 
economic activity and especially of world trade 
would have been notoriously less marked, not-
withstanding the decidedly procyclical monetary 
and fiscal policies most of them pursued until the 
eve of World War II.n I n that case, the course of 
world economic history, and perhaps especially 
that of the Latin American countries, would have 
been considerably different. 
2. The magnitude of the external shocks 
The shocks transmitted to the rest of the world 
thus greatly magnified the impact which the 
Great Depression had had in the industrial coun-
tries themselves. Moreover, the external shocks 
channelled to the Latin American economies 
were especially massive, owing especially to the 
preponderant influence of the United States 
economy in the region. 
Although the decrease of the export quan-
tum for the region as a whole was not much 
greater than the decline of the import quantum 
of the industrialized countries, i.e., 27% versus 
23.5%,l2 the collapse of the nominal value of 
Latin America's exports was out of all propor-
tion to the drop in the nominal value of indus-
trial country imports as well as to the deflation of 
10For an overview of the radical quantitative trade 
restrictions imposed by the developed countries in this period see, 
for example, A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Loughedd, The Growth of 
the International Economy ¡820-1980 (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1983). Note that between 1928 and 1931 the world stock of 
the most traded primary products expanded almost 90% (Felix, 
op.cit., 1987, table 3). 
"See the analysis presented in B. Eichengreen and J. Sachs, 
"Exchange rates and economic recovery in the 1930s", Thejoumat 
of Economic History, vol. XIV (December 1985), pp. 925-946. 
12
 B. Eichengreen and R. Portes, op.cit., 1987, tables 3 and 4, 
Nevertheless, in a few cases the extent of the contraction of the 
export quantum reached catastrophic proportions, as for example 
in Mexico, where it dropped over 41%, but especially in Chile, 
where it actually plunged more than 71% (table 6). 
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the money value of the industrial countries' 
gross domestic product. Thus, for example, the 
current value of Chile's exports plummeted 88% 
between 1929 and 1933; in the case of El Salva-
dor the value plunged 78% between 1928 and 
1932, and in Mexico, Venezuela, Peru and 
Argentina the drop was between about 70% and 
75%, while Colombia's export income fell 67% 
and that of Brazil, 63 %. " By way of contrast, the 
money value of the imports of the industrialized 
countries dropped somewhat less than 50%. 
On the other hand, while the region's import 
prices also of course declined, the fall was consid-
erably less than the nosedive of the prices of the 
region's exports. In effect, for the region as a 
whole the terms of trade collapsed almost 48% 
between 1928 and 1932 (see table 2). Those of 
Venezuela deteriorated no less than 65% 
between 1930 and 1935, those of El Salvador 
dropped 53% and those of Brazil, somewhat less 
than 50%. In Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico 
they dropped between 45 % and 40% from peak 
(as early as 1928) to trough (as late as 1934); the 
declines suffered by Ecuador and Argentina were 
somewhat less, i.e., 38% and 35%, 
respectively.14 
In sharp contrast to the outcome for the 
industrialized countries, the purchasing power 
of Latin America's exports contracted much 
more markedly than the export quantum. On a 
regional basis the real value of exports dropped 
48% between 1929 and 1933, or close to twice as 
much as the decrease of the export quantum. In 
this same period the real value of exports of the 
developed countries declined by only 13%, i.e., 
less than half the extent of the reduction of their 
total quantum of exports.15 
If the ratio of the value of exports to the 
gross domestic product of Latin America were of 
the order of 40% in 1929, the direct loss from 
the radical deterioration of its terms of trade 
would have exceeded 12% in 1933 alone, while 
the total drop in domestic income in 1933 as 
compared to 1929 in consequence of the turna-
round in the real value of its exports would have 
"ECLAC, América Latina: relación de precios del intercambio, 
"Cuadernos Estadísticos de la CEPAL" series, No, 1, Santiago, 
Chile, 1976, country tables. 
"Ibid. 
'>B. Eíchengreen and R. Portes, op.cit., 1987, tables 3 and 4. 
approached 21%. In contrast, if the contribution 
of exports to gross domestic income were of the 
order of 10% in the developed countries in 1929, 
the corresponding losses suffered by them would 
have been only 1.5% and 2.4%, respectively. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the depres-
sion of the quantum of Latin America's imports 
was even greater than the compression of the 
purchasing power of its exports. Indeed, 
between 1929 and 1933 the region's import 
quantum plunged more than 60% (see table 3). 
This additional adjustment was provoked by the 
violent reversal of resource transfers. As a result 
of the massive repatriation of foreign capital and 
the skyrocketing of the ex-post real interna-
tional interest rate in the train of the sustained 
deflation of world price levels,16 domestic 
absorption was compressed 24% between 1929 
and 1932 and 26% between the former year and 
1933 in Latin America, i.e., almost twice and 
three and one-half times as much, respectively, 
as the declines in the region's gross domestic 
product in those two periods.17 
But the most remarkable feature of this 
catastrophic episode is that the decline in Latin 
America's gross domestic product not only 
corresponded to merely a small fraction of the 
massive external shocks it supported, but was 
also less than the decrease in economic activity in 
the developed countries, in circumstances in 
which the (self-inflicted) shocks the latter had to 
contend with were, as we have seen, much less 
lfiBetween 1929 and 1930 the ex-post real interest rate (i.e., 
the nominal U.S. interest rate deflated by the change in the unit 
value of U.S. exports) rose from about 3% to close to 16%, after 
which it shot up to 33% in 1931 before descending to around 18% 
in 1932 and turning negative in 1933, as reflation commenced. 
However, if we focus on the ex-post real international interest rate 
that Latin America had to contend with (i.e., the nominal U.S. 
interest rate deflated by the change in the average price of Latin 
America's exports), the leap was much more dramatic still, since it 
soared from more than 14% in 1929 to 50% in 1930 and almost 
52% in 1931, before declining to around 19% in 1932. In 1933 it 
rose to 27%, but dropped to 6% in 1934 and became negative in 
1935. Can there be much doubt that the interest rate is the ultimate 
sticky price? (The evolution of the unit values of U.S. exports 
appears in B. Eíchengreen and R. Portes, op.cit., 1987, table 3, 
although the variation between 1928 and 1929 was estimated on 
the basis of A. Maddison, op.cit., 1982, table E3,and those of Latin 
America appear in ECLAC, op.cit., 1976, 14 and country tables.) 
"This calculation assumes that the ratios of exports and 
imports to the region's gross domestic product were 40% and 
50%, respectively, in 1929- Otherwise, the calculations are based 
on actual data appearing in ECLAC, op.cit., table 4. 
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Table 2 
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Source: liG.AC, on the basis of official data. 
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violent. Whereas the composite index of 
industria country output dwindled 17% between 
1929 and 1933, over the same period Latin 
America's gross domestic product fell by 13%. I8 
Moreover, the depression of output in the 
region's main trading partner was more than 
twice as severe as that which Latin America 
experienced, for the United States gross 
domestic product tumbled more than 29% in 
this period. While the decline in activity in other 
underdeveloped areas like Asia was slight during 
A number of authors have argued that import 
substitution in Latin America did not commence 
with the Great Depression but much earlier, 
perhaps as early as the nineteenth century in the 
largest economies of the region. While there is 
no question that the process of import 
substitution generated by the Great Depression 
in fact far surpassed in intensity and scope any 
prior process of import replacement, it is also 
true that a limited, gradual and stop-and-go 
diversification of the major Latin American 
economies did take place before the 1930s. But 
these observers are mostly right largely for the 
wrong reasons, focusing as they usually do on the 
supposed major role of tariffs in the early 
process of import substitution in Latin America. 
More recently, in the unending debate over 
whether the terms of trade of developing 
countries have experienced or will experience a 
secular deterioration, mainstream critics of Latin 
America's post-World War II economic policies 
and performance such as I. Little and 
A. Krueger19 have observed that if the terms of 
trade of developing countries had experienced a 
18ECLAC, op.cit., tables 3 and 4. 
"I.M.D, Little, Economic Development, Theory, Policy and 
International Relations, New York, Basic Books, 1982; 
A.O. Krueger, Alternative Trade Strategies and Development, 
Chicago, National Bureau of Economic Research and the 
University of Chicago Press, 1983. 
the Great Depression, thanks, in part, to the fact 
that the shocks experienced were much less 
intense than those absorbed by Latin America 
(for example, Asia's export quantum fell almost 
as much as Latin America's but its import 
quantum fell less than half as much as that of the 
latter region between 1929 and 1933), the 
subsequent recovery of the Latin American 
economies was considerably stronger than that 
of the developed countries as well as that 
achieved in Asia. 
secular deterioration, they would have 
industrialized spontaneously, and therefore 
would not —and should not in any case 
according to basic tenets of trade theory— have 
needed to recur to protective tariffs and 
quantitative trade restrictions to foment 
industrialization. The point is, of course, that 
either the terms of trade of these countries have 
not deteriorated over time, or else the use of 
restrictive trade practices has inflicted 
unnecessary welfare losses without producing 
any gains associated with industrialization other 
than those that would have occurred as a result of 
the free play of market forces. 
But this is precisely what happened in the 
initial phases of the diversification of the Latin 
American economies. In effect, both prior to the 
Great Depression and especially from 1930 to 
the Korean War, import substitution in Latin 
America was essentially in the nature of a 
spontaneous process induced gradually at first by 
a deterioration of the region's terms of trade 
from the late nineteenth century to the 1920s 
and then violently by the massive external 
shocks that pounded the region's economies in 
the 1930s. Telling criticisms have been levelled 
at the assertion that there was a secular decline 
in Latin America's terms of trade from the 1860s 
to the 1920s, and, the issue remains unresolved, 
but there is extensive documentary evidence that 
Latin America's terms of trade suffered a radical 
II 
The genesis of import substitution and the recovery 
of the Latin American economies 
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and enduring downturn from the later 1920s 
until the Korean War and that the region 
transferred a massive amount of resources to 
creditor nations during the first part of the 1930s 
after having received huge infusions of capital 
during the 1920s. Nevertheless, two apparent 
anomalies have to be addressed, i.e., the gaping 
hole in the neoclassical critique of the process of 
import substitution in Latin America, and the 
progressive build-up of restrictive trade 
practices in the region after the Korean War. 
The first of these is dealt with here. 
1. The catalytic role of external shocks 
First, a brief review of the facts is in order. If 
Latin America's terms of trade in 1928 are set 
equal to 100.0, the greatest point of deterioration 
was reached in 1933, when the index settled at a 
little under 53.20 This downturn reflected a drop 
of more than 70% in the average price of the 
region's exports, and a decline of about 21% in 
the average price of the region's imports (see 
table 2).21 
Between 1933 and 1937 the region's terms of 
trade registered a sustained recovery, but they 
continued to be situated far below the 1928 level. 
In the following three years a renewed, but less 
intense, deterioration occurred, so that at the 
beginning of World War II the index stood at 
67% of its 1928 level. During the course of the 
war it fluctuated up and down, and in 1945 was 
somewhat higher than five years before. 
Subsequently it recovered strongly in the train of 
the postwar boom. Nevertheless, when the 
Korean War broke out it was still about 7% 
below the level observed in 1928, and from that 
point until the mid-1970s the region's terms of 
trade gradually declined more or less year-in and 
year-out. 
20In this connection it should be borne in mind that from 
1919/1920 to 1928 the relative international prices of the main 
primary products dropped about 20%, i.e., even by 1928 Latin 
America's terms of trade were far below previous historical peaks. 
21The data were calculated by ECLAC, on the basis of two 
indexes. For the 1928-1970 period the price weights reflect the 
structure of Latin America's exports and imports in 1963; for the 
1971-1987 period 1980 price weights were used, and the two 
indexes were spliced together. For the years 1928 and 1929 the 
price indexes for the region as a whole were calculated by the 
authors from the available country data (i.e., on Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela) published in the 1976 ECLAC study. In this publication 
regional price indexes were calculated from 1930 onwards. 
In the first place, this exceptionally 
pronounced and for the most part prolonged 
deterioration (i.e., until the end of World 
War II) of the region's terms of trade directly 
altered domestic relative prices between the 
goods possessing extraordinary comparative 
advantages and all other tradeables, and between 
those commodities and non-traded goods and 
services. In effect, the observed movement of the 
region's terms of trade directly implied a 
reduction of almost 48%, on average, in the 
domestic relative price of traditional exports. 
That these goods continued to be produced and 
exported at all suggests just how extraordinary 
their comparative advantage was. But it also had 
something to do with the indirect repercussions 
of the decline of the relative international prices 
of primary products on domestic relative prices. 
Thus, just as a rise in the relative 
international price of a commodity (or an 
"autonomous" increase in its profitability) may 
spark off an export boom and trigger a series of 
domestic price and quantity adjustments, a 
major and sustained decline in the relative 
international price of a heretofore booming 
export leads, contrariwise, to a proportionate 
decrease in domestic income, and hence, to an 
excess supply of non-tradeable as well as 
tradeable goods and services, at prevailing 
domestic relative prices. As a result, the nominal 
price of non-traded goods and services declines 
and the balance of trade in other tradeables 
improves. The original drop in the relative 
domestic price of the erstwhile booming 
commodity is thus partially offset by this indirect 
real (i.e., spending) effect of the involution of 
the boom. On the other hand, the spending 
effect further increases the domestic relative 
price of other tradeables, so that both the direct 
and this indirect real repercussion of the 
deterioration of the terms of trade enhance the 
profitability of domestic production of these 
goods at the expense of profitability in the rest of 
the economy. Simultaneously, the resource 
movement effect further squeezes profitability 
in sectors producing traditional primary exports 
and non-traded goods and services. 
The extent to which the spending effect 
offsets the direct depression of the domestic 
relative price of export commodities caused by 
the shift in relative international prices depends 
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on the relative factor intensities of the produc-
tion functions of the various sectors. However, 
when international relative prices deteriorate, 
the domestic relative price of traditional primary 
exports normally must fall, since the nominal 
prices of other tradeables increase on account of 
the direct and spending effects. 
In addition to the direct and indirect reper-
cussions of the collapse of international com-
modity prices, the monetary effect of the ensuing 
radical deterioration of the commercial account 
balances of the Latin American economies also 
exercised a powerful indirect impact on domestic 
relative prices. Thus, like the spending effect, it 
increased the domestic relative price of tradea-
bles and thereby also partially compensated the 
direct decline in the domestic relative price of 
t rad i t iona l commodity expor t s , further 
increased the profitability of production of other 
tradeables, and additionally depressed the nomi-
nal prices of non-traded goods and services. 
Again, however, such monetary induced adjust-
ments are inherently in the nature of transitory 
phenomena. 
Furthermore, both the depressive spending 
and monetary effects were exacerbated by the 
violent reversal of resource transfers. Indeed, the 
incredible rise in the ex-post real international 
interest rate and the massive repatriation of 
foreign capital in the first half of the 1930s 
superimposed another major adjustment of 
domestic relative prices on top of, and analogous 
to, those induced through the commercial 
account. And while capital account shocks also 
presumably are in the nature of transitory 
shocks, this particular one endured until well 
into the post-World War II era. 
Finally, the reduction of the region's export 
quantum brought about by drastic deflation and 
the massive quantitative trade restrictions 
applied in the developed countries also induced a 
counterpart adjustment of domestic relative 
prices. 
For a number of Latin American countries 
the crisis broke out as early as 1928, when United 
States banks drastically curtailed their overseas 
lending in order to participate in the New York 
stock market boom. At this point, or shortly 
thereafter, most of the region's economies were 
no longer able to contend with the effects of 
already depressed international commodity 
prices while simultaneously continuing to 
expand domestic absorption. Also, by this time 
protectionist sentiment in the developed 
countries had been translated into considerable 
tariff hikes as well as growing quantitative trade 
restrictions, while the rise in United States 
interest rates provoked by the stock exchange 
bubble had considerably augmented interest 
payments on the region's foreign debt. In late 
1929 Argentina and Uruguay departed from the 
gold standard and a host of others followed suit 
in 1930 and 1931. By 1933, when the depths of 
the Great Depression had been reached, all of 
the Latin American countries had either left the 
gold s t a n d a r d and u n d e r g o n e major 
devaluations, or remained on a fixed exchange 
rate, but at a higher real effective level than 
otherwise would have obtained, since they 
maintained parity with a US dollar which was 
devalued by 4 1 % between early 1933 and early 
1934.22 
In the end, all of the Latin American govern-
ments thus abandoned the automatic gold stand-
ard adjustment process rather than suffer the 
full magnitude of the enormous loss of well-
being that the 50% reduction of domestic price 
levels on account of the direct impact of the 
deterioration of the region's terms of trade alone 
would have entailed, although a few persevered 
until the public had virtually overpowered the 
palace guard. 
It is of course theoretically possible to re-
establish an equilibrium real exchange rate 
through the deflation of domestic price levels, 
but the greater the intensity and duration of 
shocks and/or the more rigid domestic prices, 
the greater will be the output losses if the nomi-
nal exchange rate remains fixed. On the other 
hand, if the exchange rate is allowed to adjust 
freely to external shocks like those that Latin 
America confronted in the Great Depression, or 
if it is promptly raised towards (and ideally to) 
the new equilibrium level, unnecessary losses of 
well-being can be limited if not completely 
avoided. Either way, domestic relative prices 
22The sequence of events is described concisely in 
B. Eichengreen and J. Sachs, op.cit., 1985. 
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eventually will settle at the value consistent with 
macroeconomic equilibrium.23 
Thus, by comparing data on the evolution of 
international prices, exchange rates and domes-
tic prices, we may gauge roughly the extent and 
the precise direction of the relative price changes 
induced in the Latin American economies by the 
Great Depression, and hence the scope for struc-
tural change.24 
"However, there is a fundamental flaw in the automatic 
adjustment process —whether it is based on the gold standard or, 
in more recent times, the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments— that necessarily renders it more costly than an 
adjustment process based on a flexible nominal exchange rate, 
even in an economy entirely free of conventionally-defined price 
distortions. In effect, an automatic adjustment process inevitably 
generates greater unnecessary losses of well-being than does one 
fostered through a flexible nominal exchange rate, because even at 
the limit, the nominal interest rate cannot drop below zero. 
Therefore, as domestic price levels deflate, the real interest rate 
must rise to a level that is incompatible with internal balance. 
Proponents of the automatic adjustment could retort that if prices 
of goods and all other factors were instantaneously flexible, the 
ultimate downward inflexibility of the nominal interest rate would 
be of little import. But let's be honest: no matter how flexible all 
other prices may be, everything takes place over time. 
•^Before proceeding to comment the data presented in 
table 4, several caveats are in order. First, while the evolution of 
relative international prices shows variations with respect to the 
base year (i.e., 1963) and thus roughly indicates orders of 
magnitude of the profitability of the domestic production of 
exports and imports relative to each other, the index of overall 
domestic prices was set equal to the international index (and hence 
the domestic price index, in line with the small country 
assumption) of exports for the 1925/1929 period (i.e., to 100). 
This procedure was adopted both to permit a consistent 
transformation of international prices into domestic prices and to 
reflect the fact that prior to the Great Depression the profitability 
of the production of other tradeables was perforce below that of 
non-traded goods and services. However, it undoubtedly overstates 
the profitability of the production of non-tradeables relative to that 
of other tradeables. Moreover, since profitability in the production 
of exports was as a rule considerably higher than in non-tradeables, 
this method prevents any conclusions as to whether relative 
profitability as between these two sectors switched over the course 
of the 1930s, although it does of course allow for the observation of 
changes in relative prices between them. The nominal exchange 
rate also was set equal to 100 ¡n 1925/1929 for the transformation 
of international into domestic prices. Consequently, in the base 
period the ratio of domestic to international prices, as well as the 
real exchange rate, usually does not equal 100, but this is of no 
consequence. Note also that the international prices of imports 
were used as an indicator of international prices of other tradeables 
(and transformed into the corresponding domestic prices as per 
the dependent country assumption), and the domestic consumer 
price index is taken as the price of non-traded goods and setvices. 
While the former procedure is entirely satisfactory the second is 
not, since tradeables entered into domestic consumer price 
indexes; however, in this case no other option was available. 
Finally, in performing the transformation of international prices 
into domestic prices we have ignored the incidence of any domestic 
policy-induced price distortions, including multiple exchange rates 
(i.e., import exchange rates —which were the only ones 
consistently available— were used). 
Let us initially focus on the Brazilian case, as 
the evolution of that country's terms of trade was 
broadly representative of trends at the regional 
level. Between 1928/1929 and 1935/1939» the 
average price of Brazil's exports fell by 73%-
However, as a result of the direct and indirect 
effects of the multiple external shocks, the 
repercussions of which were manifested princi-
pally through a major rise in the exchange rate 
rather than a decline in domestic prices once the 
gold standard was abandoned, the decline in the 
average domestic price of Brazil's traditional 
exports was considerably less, i.e., 40% (see 
table 4). On the other hand, the average domes-
tic prices of other tradeables increased 20% in 
spite of the 65% reduction in the average inter-
national prices of these goods, while the average 
domestic price of non-traded goods and services 
declined 3% over this period as a whole. As a 
result of the Great Depression induced shifts of 
domestic prices, the average domestic price of 
traditional exports dropped 50% vis-tt-vis the 
average domestic price of other tradeables and 
about 40% vis-U-vis that of non-traded goods 
and services. Note, in particular, that while the 
average domestic price of traditional exports 
was 55% higher than that of other tradeables in 
1928/1929, it was 23% lower than the average 
domestic price of other tradeables in 1935/1939. 
The reversal of the ratio of domestic relative 
prices to those of traditional exports and other 
tradeables was of roughly similar magnitudes in 
Peru and Colombia. Whereas the average 
domestic price of traditional exports was some 
52% higher than that of other tradeables in the 
former country in 1928/1929, it was 17% lower 
than that of other tradeables in 1935/1939. The 
corresponding figures for Colombia were +50% 
and -11%. 
The decline in the unit value of Chile's 
exports was not much less than in the above-
named countries, but owing to a much larger 
exchange rate hike the average domestic price of 
its exports actually climbed over 70% in the first 
half of the 1930s and remained 25% above the 
1925/1929 level in 1935/1939- Due also to the 
fact that on the eve of the Great Depression its 
terms of trade were especially favourable, in 
1935/1939 the average domestic price of other 
tradeables was still some 18% above the average 
domestic price of traditional exports in 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: FORMATION AND EVOLUTION OF RELATIVE DOMESTIC PRICES, 
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1925/1929-1935/1939 
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Table 4 (concluded) 
Nominal international prices 
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Source: For international prices of traditional exports and other tradeables, which are those relevant for the exports and imports, respectively, of each country, see ECLAC, America Latina: 
relación de precios del intercambio, op.cil.. 1976, country tables; for exchange rates and domestic prices, see C. Diaz-Alejandro, "Latin America in Depression, 1929-1939", in The 
theory and experience of economic development I F.s fays in honour of Sir W. Arthur Leteis). M.Gersowitz.e/ji/, (eds.) (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), tables 20.4 and 20.5. 
"Average price of traditional exports (1963 price weights) in 1928/1929 = 100, and average nominal exchange rate in 1925/1929 = 100. 
"1928/1929. 
' Domestic consumer price índex. 
''United States consumer price index. 
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1935/1939, notwithstanding the 51 % deteriora-
tion of its terms of trade. Nevertheless, the rise 
in the domestic price of other tradeables over 
this period was pronounced, i.e., more than 
50%. On the other hand, Chile was the only 
country in which the price of non-traded goods 
and services relative to the average price of tradi-
tional exports declined in this period, owing 
once again to the exceptionally large devaluation 
of its currency between 1928/1929 and 
1930/1934. In the latter period the relative price 
of non-traded goods and services in terms of 
exports was 34% less than in 1928/1929, but in 
the ensuing four-year period the price of non-
tradeables relative to that of exports almost 
doubled, as the domestic price level shot up, the 
unit price of exports plunged by another one-
third, and the rate of devaluation was slowed. 
Similarly, the domestic price of other tradeables 
in terms of non-tradeables rose sharply in the 
first part of the 1930s (i.e., by 72%) but then fell 
back about 30% in the last part of the decade. 
The decline in the international price of 
Mexico's exports was appreciably less than that 
observed in the above cases. But since its terms 
of trade in 1928/1929 were approximately on a 
par with the base year (i.e., 1963), the domestic 
price of other tradeables relative to that of its 
exports rose about 12% in the 1930s. As in the 
other countries of the region, the domestic price 
of other tradeables relative to that of non-traded 
goods and services increased markedly in the 
first half of the 1930s, but subsequently declined 
as the international price of other tradeables 
continued to drop, the terms of trade partially 
recovered, and the real exchange rate stabilized. 
The major exception to these trends 
occurred in Argentina. In effect, although the 
international prices of Argentina's exports 
naturally declined during this period, by the 
latter half of the 1930s its terms of trade had 
recovered strongly from the reversal suffered in 
the early years of that decade, thanks in large 
measure to the privileged access it obtained to 
the protected British market through the 
provisions of the 1934 Runciman Treaty. 
Consequently, it was the only country in which 
the domestic price of other tradeables relative to 
that of export products did not stand 
substantially above the 1928/1929 level at the 
end of the 1930s. And by the same token, the 
adjustment of the exchange rate was notoriously 
less marked than in the rest of countries for 
which comparative data were obtained. Over the 
course of this period the major shift in domestic 
relative prices that took place as a result of 
nominal price changes was thus the rise in the 
price of non-tradeables relative to that of 
tradeables. 
Clearly, the massive shifts in domestic rela-
tive prices provoked by the Great Depression 
provided an overwhelming stimulus to the real-
location of resources from the sector producing 
erstwhile booming commodities to the rest of 
the economy, regardless of domestic policy initi-
atives, although (as discussed below) on the 
whole economic policy in Latin America did 
reinforce structural change yet without introduc-
ing major distortions in domestic prices. 
In effect, if we compare the changes in 
domestic relative prices the following pattern 
emerges. In Brazil the domestic price of other 
tradeables relative to that of traditional exports 
more than doubled between 1928/1929 and 
1935/1939; in Peru it soared over 84%; in 
Colombia it climbed 69%; in Chile it rose more 
than 50%, and in Mexico it increased by 13%. 
The only exception was Argentina, where it 
declined some 6%. 
Over the same period, the domestic price of 
non-traded goods and services relative to that of 
traditional exports shot up by 163% in Brazil; it 
more than doubled in Peru; jumped about 71% 
in Colombia; climbed 52% in Argentina; went 
up 25% in Chile, and increased by 13% in 
Mexico. 
Moreover, in both Brazil and Chile the 
domestic price of other tradeables relative to 
that of non-traded goods and services likewise 
increased substantially over this period, despite 
the drastic decline in the international prices of 
other tradeables, owing to the especially large 
exchange rate hikes in those two countries. In 
Colombia and Mexico the relative domestic price 
of other tradeables in terms of non-traded goods 
and services scarcely changed from the pre-
Great Depression years to the late 1930s, while 
in Peru it declined 10% and in Argentina it 
dropped almost 30%, owing, again, to the nota-
bly less severe external shocks experienced by 
this country and, hence, the proportionately 
smaller adjustment of its exchange rate (see 
table 4). 
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While the genesis of structural change 
spawned by the Great Depression in the Latin 
American economies —more intense in other 
tradeables in some and greater in non-tradeables 
in others— was in line with spontaneous 
mechanisms, domestic economy policy also 
promoted the reallocation of resources. 
2. The contribution of domestic policy 
In effect, the extent of the decline in the relative 
domestic price of traditional exports and of 
other tradeables was more pronounced than 
could be explained by the available price and 
exchange rate data alone. In particular, the use of 
multiple exchange régimes that discriminated 
against traditional exports, and of quantitative 
trade restrictions that discriminated against 
"non-essential" imports increased the 
movement of resources out of the traditional 
export sector and channeled then into the 
production of other tradeables. Precise 
comparative information on multiple exchange 
régimes and quantitative trade restrictions in the 
1930s is not available, but the relevant data for 
the situation prevailing around 1950 may be 
suggestive of the incidence of these policies in 
that earlier period, although it should be borne 
in mind that in general, recourse to multiple 
exchange rates and quantitative restrictions on 
trade gradually intensified over this period in a 
number of countries and increased very sharply 
in others (e.g., in Argentina in the mid- and late 
1940s). 
a) Trade policies 
With these caveats in mind, it may thus be 
noted that in Argentina the spread between the 
official exchange rate for non-essential imports 
and that for traditional exports around 1950 was 
almost 190%, while that between non-essential 
imports on the one hand and essential imports 
and non-traditional exports on the other was 
92% (see table 5).25 In Chile the corresponding 
lsin contrast, in 1934/1936 the spread between average 
import and export exchange rates in Argentina was about \2'%, 
(C. Diaz-Alejandro, "Latin America in depression 1929-1939", 
The Theory and Experience- of Economic Development: Essays in 
Honour of Sir. If. Arthur Lewis, M. Gersovitz and others (eds.). 
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982, table 20.6). 
figure for the spread between non-essential 
imports and traditional exports was 174%, 
while that between the former category of 
imports and essential ones was around 39%. On 
the other hand, the official exchange rate was the 
same for non-traditional exports and non-
essential imports, so that in this case equal 
incentives for the production of other tradeables, 
excluding capital and intermediate importables, 
were in force. Substantial spreads may also be 
observed in Costa Rica, Paraguay, Ecuador and 
Uruguay. 
On the other hand, in countries like Brazil, 
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and Nicaragua the 
scope of multiple exchange rates was rather 
limited. Thus, in Brazil the spreads were few and 
marginal, and in Colombia much the same 
pattern obtained, with the notable exception of 
the use of an exchange rate for non-traditional 
exports that was 23% higher than that for non-
essential imports. In Venezuela there was a 
small spread between the rate for non-essential 
imports and the other, common rate, while in 
Peru there was a single rate for all current 
account items (see table 5). Finally, in Cuba, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico and Panama 
one exchange rate was used for all transactions 
(see table 6). 
We have no quantitative information on 
administrative trade restrictions, but it may be 
noted that around 1950 13 of the 18 countries of 
the region for which qualitative data are 
available employed import prohibitions and/or 
licenses, while five of the 12 countries for which 
such information was obtained required advance 
deposits for imports (see table 6). 
Although quantitative trade restrictions had 
thus come to be used by the majority of the Latin 
American countries early in the post-World 
War II era (if not before), in contrast —and 
contrary to conventional belief— tariffs were 
not used to ease the adjustment to the Great 
Depression. Thus, while import tariffs were, on 
average, between 23% and 30% in the largest 
Latin American countries in the late 1920s, they 
were scarcely raised at all either during the 1930s 
or the 1940s. Indeed, between 1925/1927 and 
1932/1937 the average import tariff dropped 
from 28% to 17% in Mexico and from 26% to 
about 24% in Argentina (see table 7). Over the 
course of the same period average tariffs were 
194 CEPAL REVIEW No. 36 / December ¡988 
Table 5 

















































































Source; International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1950-¡952. 
"Pesos per US dollar. 
''Bolivianos per US dollar. 
'Cruzeiros per US dollar. 
•'Colones per US dollar. 
'Sucres per US dollar. 
^Córdobas per US dollar. 
*Guaram'es per US dollar. 
"Soles per US dollar. 
'Bolívares per US dollar. 
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increased slightly in Colombia, i.e., from 23% to 
25 %, while in Chile the general tariff was hiked 
from 25-30% to 35%. In Brazil, for which no 
earlier data were obtained, the average implicit 
tariff was under 26% in 1936.26 
Furthermore, in the 1945/1950 period the 
average tariff had dropped to 11% in Mexico, 
12% in Argentina, 14% in Brazil and 17% in 
Colombia. In Chile, in contrast, the average tariff 
appears to have continued to rise. Thus, the 
average tariff on consumer goods was hiked 
from 45% in the 1932/1937 period to 62% in 
1945/1950 (see table 7). 
On the whole, then, it may tentatively be 
affirmed that although trade policy clearly was 
fostering the process of import substitution in 
Latin America by the time the Korean War 
broke out, its contribution can scarcely be 
compared to the catalytic role played by the 
massive domestic relative price changes 
triggered by the Great Depression in the 1930s. 
Moreover, the incidence of these discriminatory 
trade policies in Latin America must also be 
interpreted in the light of the extensive price 
distortions provoked in the international 
economy by the trade policies of the industrial 
countries in the 1930s and 1940s. It may be noted 
in this respect that tariff levels in Latin America 
were considerably lower than those imposed in 
many developed countries at that time. 
On the other hand, the contrast between the 
relatively low incidence of trade policy-induced 
price distortions in most Latin American 
economies during this period and the 
progressive build-up of such distortions while 
the international economy experienced an 
unprecedented expansion in the post-war era 
goes a long way towards explaining the 
exceptional economic performance of the region 
during the 1929-1950 period and the incessant 
accumulation of macroeconomic disequilibria 
thereafter. 
b) Macroeconomic policies 
One of the principal reasons why Latin 
America outperformed the developed countries 
J6The only country for which we have some data on the 
dispersion of tariffs in the 1930s is Argentina, where tariffs on 
consumer goods ranged from 23'/? to í l ' / í , on intermediate goods 
from \'~/< to l5'/f, and on capital goods around 18' / . 
in the 1930s in spite of the notoriously greater 
shocks to which it was subjected stemmed from a 
more timely recourse to policy-guided relative 
price changes as well as the relatively greater use 
(or tolerance) of price mechanisms to effect the 
necessary structural changes. 
Thus, on balance, all of the Latin American 
countries for which data were obtained increased 
the competitiveness of their economies vis-a-vis 
the industrialized countries through major 
increases in their real exchange rates, especially 
in the early 1930s. This was particularly true in 
countries like Brazil and Chile, where the real 
exchange rate jumped 94% and 78%, 
respectively, between 1925/1929 and 
1935/1939 (see table 4). In both Colombia and 
Uruguay the real exchange rate climbed about 
60%, in this period;27 in Peru it rose 53%, in 
Mexico it went up 40%, and in Argentina it 
increased 33%.28 
Although adjustments of relative domestic 
prices proportionate to the magnitude of the 
external shocks were inevitable —a point that 
may be verified by reference to the contrasts 
among the Latin American countries 
themselves—, the timing of those adjustments, 
as well as their division between those effected 
through the real exchange rate and those 
realized by discriminatory trade policies, exerted 
a decisive influence on the extent of unnecessary 
welfare losses, i.e., on the decline of economic 
activity and the speed and scope of the recovery. 
Thus, in general, the major Latin American 
countries abandoned the drawn out and highly 
costly deflation of domestic prices in line with a 
gold standard policy régime much sooner than 
did the developed countries. While this partly 
stemmed from the relative magnitude of the 
shocks, it also reflected conscious policy 
decisions, inasmuch as technically speaking all 
countries could have opted for deflation. 
The more opportune and vigorous recovery 
of the Latin American economies was also 
promoted by the pursuit of mildly expansionary 
rather than sharply deflationary monetary 
policies: a contrast which in turn was related to 
J
"The data for Uruguay are from C. Diaz-Alejandro, up.cil., 
1982, table 20.4 
JKln all cases the lion's share of the rise in the real exchange 
rate took place in the first part of the 1950s. 
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Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF NOMINAL TARIFFS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1925-1986 
(Percentages) 
Country 1925/1927 1932/1937 1945/1950 1960/1965 1967/1970 1972/1977 1978/1981 1982/1986 
Argentina 
Average 26.0" 23.8i" 
Consumer goods ... 22.9-31.4 
Intermediate goods ... 1.0-15.0 
Capital goods ... 18.4 
Brazil 
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Consumer goods ... ... ... ... ... . ™ ... 0.0-15.0f 
Intermediate goods ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.0-15.0" 
Capital goods ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.0-15.0cc 
Source: World Bank; IBRD; United Nations; liCLAC, International Monetary Fund: Exchange Restrictions Annual Report (various years); 
CIKPI.AN; Universidad Católica de Chile: Cuadernos de Economía, No. 54-55, Santiago, Chile, 1981; Leave of Nations: Tariff level 
indices, Geneva, 1927; Bela Balassa: Development strategies in semi-industrial économies, Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982 and The structure of protection in developing countries, 1971; Centro de Estudios Monetarios 
Latinoamericanos, 1972; Carlos Díaz-Alejandro: Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1976; Manuel Martinez del Campo: Industrialización en México: hacia un análisis crítico, Mexico City, El Colegio 
de México, 1985. 
"Tariff level (1925). 
h
 1927. Consumer goods are cotton and wool manufactures; intermediate goods are agricultural inputs, raw materials, oils, etc. 
' Ad valorem tariff. Specific duties not included. 
d
 1962 (maximum value). 
' 1969 (nominal protection). 
{
 1976. Manufactured goods. 
* 1979. Nominal protection. 
* 1986. Range of tariff rates. 
' 1936 and 1951 respectively (average incidence of customs duties: customs duties divided by the value of imports). 
' 1966 and 1967 respectively (nominal protection). 
* 1977 and 1980 respectively (manufactured goods). 
' 1986 (import duties). 
"Before 1928 (basic tariff). 
" 1932. Consumer goods are luxory goods. 
" 1961 (nominal protection). 
''94.0 corresponds to 1973 and 24.0 corresponds to 1977. 
" 1979-1982 and 1986 respectively. 
' 1927, 1936, 1951 and 1959 respectively. Average of nominal tariff rates for all imports. 
' 1975 and 1979 respectively. 
' 1959 (national tariffs before the Common Market). Average nominal tariff for selected groups of manufactured products. 
" 1967 (Gimmun Market tariffs). Average nominal tariffs for selected groups of manufactured products. Figures used for Nicaragua apply 
to 1960 and 1968 respectively. 
' 1973 and 1977 respectively (nominal tariff rate). The nominal tariff rate is the nominal tariff divided by imports from outside theCACM. 
" 1972. Ad valorem equivalents of the common external tariff. Intermediate goods are food products. 
1
 1981. Nominal tariff rates. 
y
 1929, 1937 and 1948, respectively (coefficient of customs duties). The coefficient of customs duties is the quotient, at current values, of 
customs duties and the total imports. 
"" i960. Nominal tariff protection. 
ua
 1970, 1975, 1979 and 1982, respectively. Tariff level (weighted average). 
** 1976 (average tariff). 
"1985-1986 (range). 
the more timeíy abandonment of the so-called supply rose 18%, Mexico's was augmented by 
automatic adjustment process and permitted the 13%, Chile's expanded 11% and Uruguay's 
maintenance of real domestic interest rates increased about 6%. By way of contrast, close to 
markedly lower than those of countries, like the one-half of Cuba's money supply evaporated 
United States, that persisted longer in the over this period.29 
deflationary route. While the United States 
money supply contracted 16% between 
1925/1929 and 1930/1934, Brazil's money 2"CarIos Diaz-Alejandro. op.dt., 1982, table 20.7. 
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In addition, the scope for recovery in Latin 
America was enhanced considerably by the 
widespread moratorium on external debt 
payments in the early 1930s. Indeed, only 
Argentina and the Dominican Republic 
continued to effect foreign debt service 
payments throughout this period. Finally, and 
also in sharp contrast to the 1980s, the Latin 
American countries did not have to contend with 
capital flight.*0 
3. Overview of recovery and growth 
In Latin America, as in the world at large, the 
trough of the Depression was reached in 1932. In 
only two years more, however, regional output 
had not only recovered but surpassed the 1929 
level, and by 1937 it was fully 20% above the 
pre-Depression peak. By way of contrast, the 
index of the gross domestic product of the 
industrial countries taken together did not 
recover its 1929 level until 1936, and in 1937 it 
was only 7% above the pre-crisis high. Latin 
America's performance is all the more 
remarkable in view of the fact that economic 
activity in its principal trading partner still 
remained below the 1929 level as late as 1937. 
Indeed, in the United States the recovery was not 
completed until 1939, when the process of 
rearmament was greatly accelerated.31 
In addition, regional output in Asia in 1937, 
although 10% higher than its 1929 level, was 
only 6% above its 1932 level, whereas the Latin 
American gross domestic product expanded over 
39% between 1932 and 1937. Moreover, when 
Latin America surpassed its pre-Great 
Depression gross domestic product in 1934, it 
did so with a quantum of imports that was 
scarcely more than one-half its 1929 level, while 
in that same year, although Asia's output was 
also about the same as it had been in 1929, its 
import quantum was only 13% lower than in 
that year.32 
'"For a comparative historical analysis of these two issues, see 
Felix, opxit., 1987. 
UB. Eichengreen and R. Portes, opxit., 1987, tables 3 and 4, 
and A. Maddison, opxit., 1982, table A7. 
"Eichengreen and Portes, opxit., table 4. 
Between 1939 and 1945 the Latin American 
economies continued to achieve growth rates 
above those observed in much of the rest of the 
world, notwithstanding the dislocations caused 
by World War II and the sharp downturn in the 
United States economy between 1944 and 1948. 
This sustained expansion was in fact promoted 
by the marked growth of the United States econ-
omy between 1939 and 1944 and, from 1946 
onwards, by a strong recovery of the region's 
terms of trade. Thus, between 1939 and 1945 the 
regional gross domestic product expanded 3.4% 
per annum and between 1945 and 1950 it 
increased 5.3% per year (see table 1). These 
figures compare with a growth rate of about 
2.5% between 1929 and 1939. 
For the 1929-1950 period as a whole, the 
annual growth rate of regional output was 4.4% 
(table 8), compared with a growth rate of 2.7% 
per annum for the United States economy over 
this period.3* 
Finally, it may be noted that while Latin 
America's share of world exports declined from 
8.9% in 1929 to 7.9% in 1938 (which was the 
same figure recorded in 1913), by 1947 it had 
climbed to 12.2%, before dropping back to 
11.4% in 1950. On the other hand, its share of 
world imports dropped from 6.8% in 1929 to 
6.3% in 1938, rose to a peak of 11.3% in 1947, 
but dropped sharply to 8.6% in 1950,34 in spite 
of a recovery of more than 20% in its terms of 
trade between 1947 and 1950. Indeed, in 1950 
the region's terms of trade stood at a level which 
was the highest since 1929 (i.e., 93.6 versus 100) 
and which has not been witnessed again for the 
region as a whole (see table 2). Evidently, then, 
by the late 1940s the policies which were to exert 
a decisive influence on Latin America's post-war 
economic performance until 1973 and beyond 
were already taking shape. 
We will now consider briefly some of the 
basic ideas of a Latin America whose economics 
were directly forged by the experience of the 
Great Depression, but which exercised their 
greatest influence in the 1950s and 1960s. 
"Maddison, opxit., 1982, table A7. 
"Pan-American Union, The Foreign Trade of Lutin A luetics 
since 1913. Washington, D.C, 1952, p. V 
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Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
I N SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1929-1950" 
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The Prebisch thesis 
Raúl Prebisch set out to achieve two goals when 
he published his pathbreaking, but controver-
sial, 1949 study of the economic development of 
Latin America.35 These goals probably did not 
include the founding of a Latin American school 
of economic thought, although of course he did 
achieve this; rather, his purpose was to explain 
the causes underlying Latin America's economic 
backwardness vis-a-vis the industrialized coun-
"Raúl Prebisch, The economic Development of Latin 
America and Its Principal Problems (E/CN.12/89/Rev.l). United 
Nations publication, Sales No.: 50.I1.G.2. 
tries and, above all, to persuade his fellow Latin 
Americans of the rationale for the intervention 
of the free play of market forces and lay out a 
policy agenda for the transformation of the 
economies of the region. Although we would like 
to, we can scarcely do justice to his contribution 
here. Instead, we merely propose to analyse 
briefly the proposition most closely identified 
with Prebisch —and the one for which he was 
most attacked—, both in order to suggest the 
need for a reappraisal of his basic thesis, and to 
introduce the ideas that were to have such a 
remarkable influence on economic policy both in 
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Latin America and in other developing countries 
in the post-war era.36 
Over the course of the years Prebisch 
invoked a variety of arguments to explain his 
much-criticized 1949 finding that a secular 
deterioration of the terms of trade of the Latin 
American economies was observable from the 
mid-1860s to the mid-1930s.37 However, the 
explanation he originally developed in his 1949 
study is not only the one that has best withstood 
the test of time, but subsequently became 
enshrined as the central proposition on which 
the rent-seeking literature has been built. 
Paradoxically, however, the sharp controversy 
over whether the terms of trade of primary 
producers ever did, or continue to, exhibit a 
secular deterioration persists to this very day.38 
Briefly, Prebisch's original explanation of 
his finding of an apparent secular deterioration 
of the terms of trade of the Latin American 
economies turned on the argument that in the 
centre of the world economy (to use the 
nomenclature he coined to refer to the 
industrially most advanced countries), labour 
and producer coalitions gradually push the 
domestic prices of products produced in highly 
concentrated industries, and hence the 
international prices of these products (as per a 
realistic big country assumption), above the 
market clearing levels over the course of 
successive economic cycles, mainly by 
successfully resisting the price and wage 
reductions warranted to maintain in the 
manufacturing sector (although not necessarily 
' I n his original analysis of the economic development of 
Latin America and other studies written by them in the early 1950s, 
Prebisch made a number of pioneering, but generally overlooked, 
contributions to what much later became known as open economy 
macroeconomics. Economists in the United States unwittingly 
rediscovered, although greatly extended, his early analyses in this 
field when they finally became obliged to drop the fiction that the 
United States continued to be a closed economy. As is discussed 
below, he also pioneered in his 1949 study what later became the 
central tenet of the rent-seeking literature. 
,7A year after Prebisch, H.W. Singer also published a similar 
finding in this study "The distribution of gains between investing 
and borrowing countries", American Economic Review, vol. 40, 
No. 2, May 1950. 
"•See, for example, the recent debate between H.W. Singer 
and B. Batassa over this issue: H.W. Singer, "The terms of trade 
controversy and the evolution of soft financing: early years in the 
U.N.", pp. 275-305, and B. Balassa, "Gimment", in Pioneers in 
Development, G.M. Meier and D. Seers (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), pp. 304-3U. (A World Bank publication.) 
in the economy as a whole) full employment 
during cyclical downturns, but also perhaps as a 
result of obtaining price increases in excess of 
competitive ones during cyclical upturns.39 
In the periphery of the world economy (to 
use the term he introduced for the underdeve-
loped countries), in contrast, the prices of prim-
ary products (and of factors) h\\ pari passu with 
cyclical downturns in the centre, while they 
increase in consonance with the rise in demand 
for these products during cyclical upturns in the 
centre. 
The maintenance of the international prices 
of primary products at market clearing levels 
over the course of successive economic cycles 
reflects, according to Prebisch, the historical 
dearth of effective producer and labour coali-
tions in the production of primary products at 
the world level, which in turn stems fundamen-
tally from the worldwide abundance of most 
natural resources and, in recent years, from the 
gradual emergence of a structural labour surplus 
in the periphery. While abundant natural 
resource endowments in the world economy as a 
whole preclude the long-run maintenance of sig-
nificant degrees of concentration in the produc-
tion of most primary products in the 
international economy at large (as per a realistic 
small country assumption), and hence likewise 
preclude the establishment of supracompetitive 
international prices for these products in the 
long run, the structural labour surplus under-
mines the maintenance of supercompetitive 
wages in the production of primary products.40 
Thus, according as the international prices 
of manufactured goods produced in concentrated 
industries gradually rise above competitive 
v
'For a detailed historical analysis of the spread and 
distortionary price effects of macroeconomic coalitions in the 
developed countries, see M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of 
Nations: Economic Growth. Stagflation and Social Rigidities. New 
Haven, G>nnecticut, Yale University Press, 1982. 
'"Nevertheless, labour coalitions could push wages above the 
social opportunity cost of labour within individual countries 
according as property rights to natural resources are concentrated 
at the national level, as was discussed in a previous section. The 
output prices of the product in question would still be determined 
competitively in the international market, however. In effect, as 
the recent evolution of the international price of petroleum 
suggests, the setting of international prices above competitive 
levels through producer collusion, even for a commodity for which 
world demand ¡s highly inelastic, would appear to be unsustainable 
in the long run. 
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levels over successive economic cycles, while the 
international prices of commodities remain at 
competitive levels, the terms of trade of 
peripheral countries will deteriorate steadily, as 
long as peripheral countries continue to 
specialize completely in the production of 
tradeables in which they possess extraordinary 
comparative advantage.41 Prebisch's analysis 
simultaneously provides an explanation, as he 
repeatedly noted in his published work and 
public pronouncements, for the increasing 
protection of primary producers in centre 
countries. It is a well-documented fact that 
subsidies for producers of commodities in the 
industrialized countries have increased more or 
less progressively over time.42 This trend has at 
the same time exerted an additional and 
increasingly powerful depressive effect on the 
international prices of a growing number of 
commodities simultaneously produced in both 
the centre and periphery, as declining 
international prices of these primary products 
lead to growing subsidization of primary 
producers in the industrialized countries, which 
in turn generates excess supplies of these 
products, further declines of their international 
prices and additional subsidies. 
If the terms of trade for primary products 
have not in fact generally declined over the years, 
one might be hard pressed to explain why the 
extent and scope of protection of primary 
producers in industrialized countries has 
expanded so notoriously over the same period. 
Yet there is no doubt that farm lobbies have 
gradually become highly organized and active in 
"Gmtrary to the mistaken assertions of some of his critics, 
Prebisch did not adduce from this underlying argument, nor from 
the data that seemed tu show a secular deterioration id the terms of 
trade of Latin American countries from the mid-1860s to the mid-
1930s, that the terms of trade of peripheral countries would 
permanently deteriorate over time. One countervailing tendency 
of course stemmed from competition among industrialized 
countries. The other issued from his normative analysis. In effect, 
he urged the periphery to industrialize precisely to check the 
secular deterioration of their terms of trade. 
•"See, for example, A.M. Bal ¡scan and J.A. Roumasset, 
"Public choice of economic policy: the growth of agriculture 
protection". Review of World Vxonomks, 1987, pp. 232-249, and 
B. Heitger, "Import protection and export performance. Their 
impact on economic growth", Review of World Hamo mies, 1987, 
pp. 249-261. 
most developed countries in spite of 
considerable (but generally declining degrees of) 
producer dispersion; perhaps this is how they 
have managed to obtain supracompetitive 
domestic prices (i.e., vis-a-vis international 
prices) for their products, even though the 
secular international terms of trade of their 
produce have not deteriorated.43 Perhaps what 
has happened is that during successive cyclical 
downturns these lobbies manage to obtain 
compensatory subsidies, which they are able to 
retain at least partially during successive cyclical 
upturns. But if this were the case, the excess 
supplies thus generated, in conjunction with the 
attendant barriers to imports of these products 
from competitors in the periphery, would 
necessarily lead to a gradual secular decline of the 
international prices of these primary products. 
We have thus come full circle to Prebisch's 
argument. In effect, even if a secular decline in 
the terms of trade of primary products did not 
trigger the progressive expansion of the 
incidence and scope of protection of primary 
producers in the industrialized countries, the 
progressive growth of these subsidies as a result 
of the lobbying activities of farm coalitions 
would engender an ongoing deterioration in the 
international prices of these commodities vis-a-
vis the competitive levels that would obtain in 
the absence of protection. In this case, Prebisch's 
seminal analysis of the impact of producer 
coalitions in the manufacturing sectors in the 
centre is equally applicable to the repercussions 
of fa,rm coalitions in the centre, with the 
difference that the former push both the 
domestic and international prices of 
manufactured products above competitive 
levels, while the latter inflate the domestic prices 
of commodities in the centre above the 
competitive international prices of those same 
goods but depress their international prices 
below the competitive levels. This evidently is 
why Prebisch refrained from lumping together 
•"Note that the rise of effective national coalitions of farm 
producers does not invalidate our assertion that the abundance and 
dispersion of producers on a world scale prevents the maintenance 
of, if not attempts to form, effective international coalitions of 
commodity producers. 
202 CEPAL REVIEW No. 36 / December 1988 
primary producers in the centre with primary 
producers in the periphery.44 
Following Prebisch's original analysis, we have 
thus traced the genesis of international price distor-
tions and suggested how they may account directly 
for a considerable part —perhaps the lion's share— 
of the domestic output price distortions prevail-
ing in Latin America from the 1930s to the 
mid-1950s, when domestic trade and macroeco-
nomic policies considerably augmented the inci-
dence of output price distortions in the region's 
economies. Prebisch's analysis again becomes 
especially relevant in the 1980s, as will be dis-
cussed on another occasion. 
In contrast, to domestic policy-induced 
output price distortions (the effects of which are 
essentially limited to internal income transfers if 
the repercussions of rent-seeking activities are 
ignored), those provoked by international price 
distortions like the ones traced above directly 
inflict a proportional income loss on the 
periphery. Moreover, this income loss may 
generate spillover effects on output, since such 
non-market clearing prices would prevent the 
maintenance of full employment, unless 
nominal prices of non-traded goods and services 
were sufficiently flexible in a downward 
direction. Alternatively, inflation may result, if 
adjustment has to be pursued by raising the 
nominal exchange rate to contend with the 
prevalence of coalitions. By way of contrast, 
these international price distortions likewise 
entail internal income transfers in the centre but 
translate into a proportional income gain (at the 
expense of the periphery), which explains why 
non-market clearing prices may not generate 
significant unemployment there, although they 
may occasion inflation. Once the dynamic 
ramifications of price distortion emerge, 
however, the output and employment 
responsiveness of the central economy will 
gradually be curtailed. Endogenous policy-
4JOf course, once a former peripheral country rises to the 
ranks of the industrialized countries, one would eventually expect 
to observe subsidization of primary producers in that country as 
well. Japan, and recently Korea, of course come to mind here. See, 
for example, M.V. Martin and J. A. McDonald, "Food grain policy 
in the Republic of Korea: the economic cost of self-sufficiency", 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 34, No. 2, 
January 1986, pp. 315-331. 
induced distortions would of course further 
weaken economic performance in the periphery. 
Prebisch's 1949 study of the economic 
development of Latin America thus presents a 
pioneering analysis of the implications of the 
interaction of a fixed-priced sector with a flex-
priced sector, in a unified world economy, 
Moreover (and in contrast to Keynes, for 
example), his analysis is anchored firmly in a 
microeconomic explanation of the sources of 
output and factor market distortions. 
The similarities between Prebisch's 1949 
paradigm and Olson's celebrated theory of the 
rise and decline of nations published 33 years 
later is striking.45 One main difference stems 
from the fact that whereas Prebisch focused on 
the interaction of a downwardly-inflexible-price 
centre with a flex-price periphery, Olson cast his 
•analysis in terms of fixed and flex-price sectors 
within individual economies. And although 
Olson developed a much more rigorous and 
comprehensive treatment of the microeconomic 
foundations of macroeconomic coalitions, the 
decidedly open-economy macroeconomic 
flavour of Prebisch's analysis was likewise way 
ahead of its time. 
But was Prebisch right? If one were to judge 
his proposition on the basis of the rationale for 
the rewards bestowed by the Nobel Prize Com-
mittee for creative economic thought, the 
answer would be yes, since in 1985 J. Buchanan 
won the Nobel Prize in economics for his semi-
nal contributions to the public choice branch of 
t(ie rent-seeking literature —contributions 
which, like many others made to the rent-
seeking literature, do not look so pioneering 
once one reads Prebisch.46 
"M. Olson, op.cit., 1982. 
'^Consider, for example, the following: "Our assertion that 
markets in excess-supply disequilibrium imply unemployment of 
resources requires elaboration. In general equilibrium analysis, the 
normal assumption is that the excluded group will leave the 
activity and undertake other activities; barriers to entry misallocate 
resources, but they do not create unemployment. In our coalitional 
equilibrium, individuals remain involuntarily unemployed, in that 
they would be willing to accept a job at the same wage that some 
others with the same endowment of human capital as they have are 
currently receiving, and even at the marginal revenue product they 
would have in a coalition-free economy, but sometimes they cannot 
obtain such a job however much they may search. As Olson ( 1982) 
explains, countries in which only a small segment of the economy 
has fallen under the thrall of special-interest groups will normally 
not have any significant unemployment, because the much larger 
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On the other hand, the tally of pro and con-
tra articles on the Prebisch thesis is heavily 
weighted against his empirical finding of a secu-
lar deterioration in the terms of trade of Latin 
America from the 1860s to the 1930s.47 
Rather than get bogged down in that debate, 
let us consider what the evolution of Latin 
America's terms of trade between the Great 
Depression and the present crisis looks like. 
Between 1928 and 1987 the trend rate of change 
of the price index of Latín America's merchan-
dise exports was -0.3% per annum, while the 
trend rate of change of the unit value of its 
merchandise imports was +0.25% per annum. 
Its gross barter terms of trade therefore deterio-
rated at the rate of 0.55% per year over the 
course of this period (see tablé 2). 
Are six decades long enough to speak of a 
secular deterioration of the terms of trade of the 
Latin American economies? If not, how does one 
explain the fact that beginning in the early 1980s 
authorities like the International Monetary Fund 
promoted massive adjustments in developing 
countries partly on the basis of the assertion that 
flex-price sector will absorb the unemployed with no great 
reduction in the wages ¡md prices in that sector. If large parts of a 
country's economy are, by contrast, under the control of 
distributional coalitions, the exclusion in the controlled sectors will 
have kept an important part of the factor supply in the whole 
economy from being employed in the sectors in which they would 
otherwise have been employed. The shift of resources to the flex-
price sector will then be so great thai large variations in the returns 
ro homogeneous factors will emerge. So many people will be 
crowded into the selling apples on the street corners sector that 
employment in this sector can in depressions come to be regarded 
as synonymous with involuntary unemployment. At an extreme, 
the flex-price wage can be driven below the reservation wages of 
even the relatively industrious, or even to zero. 
"The more extensive the special-interest groups and the non-
ma rltet-c lea ring prices that lobbying and cartelization bring about, 
the more extensive are the disparities ¡n the rates of return for 
homogeneous resources. The greater these disparities, the more it 
pays to invest in searching and queueing for positions in the 
distributional coalitions. The extra search in such a case is not, like 
the search in a purely competitive economy, a socially efficient 
investment in information; it is a search for rents that would 
the deterioration of the terms of trade they had 
experienced since the mid-1970s was in the 
nature of a permanent shock?48 
Returning to the long run data on Latin 
America's terms of trade, it should also be noted 
that the observed deterioration would have been 
even greater had the region not followed the 
normative proposition Prebisch derived from 
his positive analysis, i.e., the promotion of indus-
trialization through the intervention of the free 
play of market forces. This observation brings us 
to our final and most important comment on the 
Prebisch thesis. 
In effect, while we consider that Prebisch 
was on the mark in his positive analysis, the 
appeal of his approach, combined with his 
almost exclusive concern with one periphery 
rather than with the small country aspect of the 
problem, led to multiple and pronounced policy 
excesses in Latin America in the post-war years. 
However, if justice is to be done, it should be 
noted that he himself was one of the earliest and 
harshest critics of policies that, ironically, were 
based (however tenuously) on his analysis. 
otherwise accrue to others. The extra time spent searching and 
queueing is a type of social waste or involuntary unemployment 
arising from the distributional coalitions that created the 
disparities in rates of return." (D.C Grander and M.Olson, 
"Coalitions and macroeconomics", Neoclassical Political iiciniomy: 
The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DM' Activities. David C 
Colander (comp.t, Cambridge, Mass.: Bal linger Publishing 
Company, 1984, pp. 120-121.) 
4
 "Two of the main objections are that Prebisch indirectly 
calculated Latin America's terms of trade on the basis of those of 
the United Kingdom (i.e., as the reciprocal of Great Britain's terms 
of trade), and that he failed to take into account the effect of the 
decline of international transportation costs over the course of this 
period. 
'"See, for example, "A G»nversation with Mr. de Larosière', 
Finance and Development, vol. 19, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 4-7 and 
M. Khan and M. Knight, "Determinants of current account 
balance of non-oil developing countries ¡n the 1970s: an empirical 
analysis", Ml/' Staff Papers, vol.30, No. 2 (December I98Ü), 
pp. 819-842. 
